Unemployment insurance (UI) protects workers against the loss of earnings when they lose their job, but more generous benefits can also lengthen unemployment spells and lead more workers to enter unemployment. In France, the generosity of UI is governed mainly by the benefit level, the qualifying period of work needed to open a claim, and the potential benefit duration.
In a policy note for France’s Conseil d’analyse économique (CAE), Fontaine, Rathelot, and Roulet (2026) use the MVPF to compare possible reforms that would reduce the generosity of French UI. One of these is a hypothetical increase in the minimum qualifying period from 6 to 8 months of work. Under current rules, a worker must have worked 6 months within the last 24 months to be eligible. The jobseekers it would affect are young and have low wages: their median age is 33 and their median monthly salary before job loss is about €1,200, and the paper describes them as the poorest jobseekers.
The paper computes the MVPF of raising the qualifying period from 6 to 8 months per euro of mechanical savings. It uses its own estimates, from Crédit Mutuel Alliance Fédérale bank data, of the drop in consumption six months after job loss among the jobseekers the reform affects.
MVPF = 1.6
The net cost is estimated as €1 of UI benefit plus the fiscal externalities from behavioral responses. Tightening eligibility could lead some workers to stay in work longer, for example if firms offered more 8-month contracts in place of 6-month ones.
Brébion, Briole, and Khoury (2025) study a 2009 reform that lowered the qualifying period from 6 to 4 months. They find more 4-month contracts relative to 3-month contracts after the reform, but no detectable fall in 6-month contracts relative to 5-month contracts. Using data shared by these authors, the paper finds that behavioral effects would add at most 2 cents to each euro saved directly by raising the qualifying period, so the budgetary effect is essentially mechanical.
In the paper’s accounting budget model, the reform saves €446 million a year in benefits once fully phased in, for a net cost of €1.00 per euro of benefit.
The willingness to pay for €1 of UI benefits is estimated as
WTP = 1 + \gamma \frac{\Delta c}{c}
to capture that jobseekers are willing to pay more than €1 to the extent that they are risk averse and that their consumption falls when they lose their job. Risk aversion is measured by the coefficient of relative risk aversion, γ, and the consumption drop by Δc/c. The paper assumes a coefficient of relative risk aversion of 4.5, and its estimate of the drop in consumption six months after job loss for this young, low-wage population is 12.46 percent. This leads to a willingness to pay of €1 + 4.5 × €0.1246 = €1.561.
With a willingness to pay of €1.561 and a net cost of €1.000 per euro of benefit, the MVPF is 1.56. Because the reform tightens eligibility, the MVPF can also be read the other way: the affected jobseekers would be willing to pay €1.56 to avoid the reform for each euro of net savings it generates. With a coefficient of relative risk aversion of 2 instead of 4.5, the willingness to pay falls to €1.249 and the MVPF to 1.25.
Brébion, Clément, Simon Briole, and Laura Khoury (2025). “Unemployment Insurance Eligibility and Employment Duration.” Working Paper. https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.5362825
Fontaine, François, Roland Rathelot, and Alexandra Roulet (2026). “Measuring the Efficiency of Unemployment Insurance.” Les notes du conseil d’analyse économique, No. 90. https://cae-eco.fr/static/pdf/CAE090_Assurance-chomage_260630_EN.pdf