Unemployment Insurance Benefit Levels in Norway (Women)
Introduction
Unemployment insurance (UI) protects workers against the risk of lost earnings during a spell of unemployment, but a more generous system can also weaken the incentive to search for and accept a new job. The generosity of most UI systems is governed by two parameters: the level of benefits relative to previous earnings, and the potential benefit duration. Unemployment insurance systems are implemented widely in European Union countries, but the specific eligibility requirements and durations vary.
The Norwegian UI system determines benefits according to income earned in the previous calendar year. Workers who have been continuously employed less than two years will not have earned income for the entirety of the previous calendar year, which provides plausibly exogenous variation in earned benefits according to the exact timing of when in the current calendar year workers’ unemployment spells began. Røed and Zhang (2003) exploit the variation amongst this subgroup to estimate the effect of benefit levels on duration of unemployment.
Le Barbanchon et al. (2024) draw upon this subgroup estimate from Røed and Zhang (2003) to compute the MVPF of a marginal change to UI benefit levels for women in Norway. The calculation builds upon Schmieder and Von Wachter (2016) for a measure of the fiscal externality induced by the policy.
MVPF = 0.8
Net Cost
The net cost is estimated as $1 of additional UI benefit plus the fiscal externalities from reduced search effort for a new job. Reduced search effort means people will be covered by UI for longer, leading to more total UI payouts. In addition, longer periods of non-employment lead to a fiscal externality through reduced income taxes.
The paper updates a calculation from Schmieder and Von Wachter (2016) to get a fiscal externality of $0.56 and a net government cost of $1.56.
Willingness to Pay
The willingness to pay for $1 of additional UI benefits is estimated as
to capture that individuals are willing to pay more than $1 to the extent to which they are risk averse. This is measured by the coefficient of relative risk aversion, gamma, and the extent to which they experience a consumption drop upon unemployment. The paper assumes a coefficient of relative risk aversion of 4 and a 4.4% estimate of consumption drop at job loss from Kolsrud et al. (2018). This leads to a willingness to pay of $1 + 4*$0.044 = $1.18.
MVPF Summary
With a willingness to pay of $1.18 and a net government cost of $1.56, this leads to an MVPF of 0.75.
References
Kolsrud, Jonas, Camille Landais, Peter Nilsson, and Johannes Spinnewijn (2018). “The Optimal Timing of Unemployment Benefits: Theory and Evidence from Sweden.” American Economic Review, 108(4-5): 985–1033. https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.20160816.
Le Barbanchon, Thomas, Johannes Schmieder, and Andrea Weber (2024).“Chapter 6 – Job search, unemployment insurance, and active labor market policies.” Handbook of Labor Economics, 5: 435-580. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1016/bs.heslab.2024.11.006.
Røed, Knut and Tao Zhang (2003), “Does Unemployment Compensation Affect Unemployment Duration?” The Economic Journal, 113(484): 190–206. https://academic.oup.com/ej/article/113/484/190/5079524.
Schmieder, Johannes F. and Till Von Wachter (2016). “The Effects of Unemployment Insurance Benefits: New Evidence and Interpretation.” Annual Review of Economics, 547-581. DOI: https://www.annualreviews.org/doi/abs/10.1146/annurev-economics-080614-115758.
Policy Features
- Category
- Social Insurance
- Sub-Category
- Unemp. Ins.
- Beneficiary Type(s)
- Adults
- Average Age
- 38
- Average Income
- 22,000
- Country of Implementation
- Norway
- Empirical Method
- IV
- Research Type
- Secondary
- Peer Reviewed
- Yes
- MVPF Publication Link
- academic.oup.com/ej/article/113/484/190/5079524