Many health insurance policies include cost-sharing mechanisms, such as deductibles, coinsurance, and copayments. In many settings, individuals can purchase supplemental insurance which reduces their exposure to these forms of cost sharing. Most elderly Americans have health insurance through Medicare, which controls utilization with a deductible of approximately $1,000 for each hospital admission and coinsurance of 20% for physician office visits. Although most private insurance prohibits the purchase of supplemental insurance, Medicare allows its beneficiaries to purchase private supplemental insurance called Medigap that covers the costs associated with coinsurance.
Cabral and Mahoney (2019) study the impact of Medigap on healthcare utilization and Medicare costs. They exploit variation in Medigap prices across state boundaries. They find that lower prices for Medigap leads to greater Medigap take-up. This in turn increases healthcare utilization and the costs to Medicare, who covers 80% of the cost of this utilization. Hendren and Sprung-Keyser (2020) translate these analyses into their implied MVPF of a Medigap tax. Hendren and Sprung-Keyser (2020) consider the specification that analyzes the impact of going from a 5% to 0% tax on Medigap from Table 9 of Cabral and Mahoney (2019).
MVPF = 0.4
The cost of the tax change has two components. First, there is the lost tax revenue from the people who choose to no longer purchase Medigap policies when faced with a 5% tax. Cabral and Mahoney (2019) estimate this to be $39. Second, there is the cost from increased Medicare expenses due to the change in healthcare utilization. Cabral and Mahoney (2019) estimate this to be $60. In sum, the government cost is $99.
The willingness to pay for the Medigap tax is given by the amount of money that the tax costs individuals holding their behavior fixed. At a 5% tax, the premiums are $1,779, so the mechanical impact of removing the 5% tax is 5%*1779 = $89 per Medigap enrollee, or $39.14 per Medicare enrollee since Medigap has 44% market share with the 5% tax. This $39.14 is the willingness to pay to avoid the tax.
Dividing the willingness to pay by the net cost results in an MVPF of 0.40 (= 39.14 / 99). This low MVPF reflects the finding that Medigap coverage imposes an externality on the government’s Medicare program, so that taxing Medigap is a comparatively efficient source of raising revenue.
Cabral, Marika and Neale Mahoney (2019). “Externalities and Taxation of Supplemental Insurance: A Study of Medicare and Medigap.” American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, 11(2), 37-73. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1257/app.20160350
Hendren, Nathaniel and Ben Sprung-Keyser (2020). “A Unified Welfare Analysis of Government Policies.” The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 135(3): 1209–1318. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1093/qje/qjaa006