In 1999, the Welfare to Work Voucher Program was introduced to give 50,000 additional housing vouchers through local Public Housing Authorities across the country. During the years 2000 and 2001, the Department of Housing and Urban Development ran a randomized controlled trial where applicants on waiting lists were randomly selected to immediately receive a voucher offer. This was a departure from the priority rules often used by Public Housing Authorities to allocate voucher offers. Ruby (2025) evaluates the welfare implications of three priority rules – random assignment, vouchers offered to households with positive wage earnings, vouchers offered to households with zero wage earnings.
The paper uses data from the Welfare to Work Voucher Experiment which includes a baseline survey of demographic information and baseline rent conducted prior to randomization, as well as linked administrative databases which document quarterly labor earnings and welfare income. However, the paper does not observe rents at any point after randomization. For non-voucher recipients, rent is imputed from census-tract level rent data for households with income below $50,000 using the U.S. Census Bureau, 2000 Census of Population and Housing, Summary File 3. For voucher recipients, rent is imputed from census-tract level household and federal government spending on housing from the Picture of Subsidized Housing 2000.
The paper finds that the MVPF does not vary whether one distributes housing vouchers equally across eligible participants, targets those with no wage earnings, or targets those with positive wage earnings. Below is a discussion of the estimated MVPF of offering an additional housing voucher with equal probability to a family with zero or positive wage earnings.
MVPF = 0.7
Net government cost is computed as the direct cost of the voucher as well as the fiscal externalities of changes to welfare and Earned Income Tax Credit payments that occur due to responses in labor supply. The housing voucher requires participants to contribute 30% of their household income (including Temporary Assistance for Needy Families) toward rent, and the rest of the unit is covered. Therefore, the mechanical cost of the voucher is the average rent for voucher recipients minus 30 percent of voucher recipients’ total income: $1,817.27 – 0.3($1,941.71) = $1,234.76.
Voucher recipients adjust their labor earnings which in turn affects the amount of welfare income and Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) they receive. Voucher recipients receive $1.31 more in welfare income and $37.37 less in EITC.
The net cost is therefore $1,234.76 + $1.31 – $37.37 = $1,198.70.
The paper estimates willingness-to-pay as the value of the housing voucher that participants would receive if they did not adjust their labor supply or housing consumption. This assumes that households optimize and therefore do not value the additional housing subsidy that they receive due to choosing a higher-rent apartment or working less.
The willingness-to-pay is calculated as without-voucher average rent minus 30% of the average without-voucher total income (as voucher recipients are required to contribute 30% of their income toward rent). This is $1,483.22 -0.3*($2,032.89) = $873.36.
The willingness-to-pay for a housing voucher is $873.36 and the cost to the government of providing a housing voucher is $1,198.70, so the estimated MVPF is 0.73.
The paper also calculates the MVPFs of targeting housing vouchers to families with no wage earnings or to families with positive wage earnings. The MVPFs for these alternative priority rules are calculated in an analogous manner (with different values for average rents and incomes) and both also have MVPFs of 0.73.
Ruby, Sasha (2024). “Targeting Transfers Through Priority Rules: Evidence from the Housing Choice Voucher Program.” Working Paper. https://www.sasha-ruby.com/files/Priority.pdf