SNAP Caseworker Effectiveness
Introduction
Cook and East (2026) evaluate the effect of the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) on labor supply using quasi-random assignment of applicants to caseworkers. The authors create an instrument that captures the likelihood that a certain caseworker will accept a random application. This allows them to measure the effect of receiving SNAP on labor supply for those whose application is accepted due to receiving a higher likelihood caseworker.
The authors use data on SNAP applicants from a single mountain-plains state over the period 2011-2016 which includes basic demographic information, when they apply, the caseworker they are assigned to, and SNAP benefit receipt or denial. In addition, the paper links all applicants to the state’s Unemployment Insurance database which allows them to observe earnings and employment. From their instrumental variables model the authors find small and insignificant effects of SNAP on labor supply.
Due to limited caseworker discretion in the decision to approve or deny SNAP applicants, the paper hypothesizes that variation in approval likelihood due to caseworker assignment stems from how much guidance caseworkers are giving applicants in navigating the complex application process. The paper creates an MVPF for a hypothetical policy which led to a one standard deviation increase in the likelihood of caseworkers approving a random application. Given the papers’ hypothesis it is reasonable to think of this as a policy which leads caseworkers to provide more guidance to applicants.
MVPF = 1.1
Net Cost
The paper estimates the net cost of eliminating the E&T Program as the increase in costs as a result of more SNAP benefits, the reduced administrative costs from not running the program, and any fiscal externalities.
The increase in costs due to additional SNAP benefits paid is $118 per participant per month as discussed below in “willingness to pay.” The estimated administrative costs comes out to $11.32 per participant per month when adjusted to 2021 dollars. The paper estimates a statistically insignificant effect on earnings and therefore omits any fiscal externalities from the net cost calculation.
The net cost is then $118 – $11.32 = 106.68.
Willingness to Pay
The paper estimates the willingness to pay for the elimination of E&T is equal to the change in SNAP benefit amounts if E&T were to be eliminated. The paper assumes the value of the E&T Program itself to participants is zero based on the result that E&T does not improve job finding or job quality. The paper then uses the IV-estimated change in benefit amounts resulting from being referred to E&T requirements, which is $708 decrease over a 6-month period or $118 per month on average. The paper notes that this is conservative as it ignores any willingness to pay to avoid the costs imposed by E&T.
MVPF Summary
The estimated MVPF is then 118/106.68 = 1.11.
References
Cook, Jason and Chloe East (2026). “The Effect of Means-Tested Transfers on Work: Evidence From Quasi-Randomly Assigned Snap Caseworkers.” Journal of Public Economics 257: 105631. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jpubeco.2026.105631
Policy Features
- Category
- Social Insurance
- Sub-Category
- Nutrition
- Beneficiary Type(s)
- Adults
- Average Age
- 34
- Average Income
- 1583
- Country of Implementation
- United States
- Empirical Method
- IV
- Research Type
- Primary
- Peer Reviewed
- Yes
- MVPF Publication Link
- doi.org/10.1016/j.jpubeco.2026.105631