The Pell Grant provides financial support to students from low-income families attending college. Students received $28 billion in federal Pell Grants during the 2015-16 academic year. Hendren and Sprung-Keyser (2020) use work by Denning et al. (2019) that examines the impact of additional Pell Grant provision in the state of Texas using a discontinuity in Pell provision for those just above and just above the zero Expected Family Contribution threshold. Denning et al. (2019) use this discontinuity to calculate the impact of greater grant eligibility on years of school attended and earnings. Hendren and Sprung-Keyser (2020) use these estimates to compute the policy’s MVPF. Hendren and Sprung-Keyser (2020) focus on their main specification – the impact of Pell Grant support on new college enrollees.
Pays for Itself
Hendren and Sprung-Keyser (2020) calculate net costs by starting with $1,000 in initial program costs and accounting for any relevant fiscal externalities. First, Hendren and Sprung-Keyser (2020) account for the additional costs due to increased educational attainment on the part of those eligible for Pell Aid. Denning et al. (2019) show that the provision of Pell Grant aid leads to greater educational persistence on the part of students. Hendren and Sprung-Keyser (2020) sum the total number of years of additional enrollment up until seven years after first grant receipt. They calculate the costs based on total expenditures for a single year of four-year public college enrollment. In particular, they follow the approach of Zimmerman (2014), and calculate costs based on data from the Delta Cost Project. This produces more conservative estimates than the approach taken in Denning et al. (2019). Denning et al. (2019) measure total government costs in terms of Pell Grants and other grant aid crowded in, rather than including government funding directly provided to schools. The result is that $1,000 in Pell Grant Aid costs an additional $1,030 in fiscal costs during subsequent years. Next, Hendren and Sprung-Keyser (2020) account for the changes in taxes paid and transfers received based on the earnings gains calculated in the willingness to pay section. That results in a fiscal externality of $19,409 in additional revenue to the government and a total net windfall of $17,379.
In their primary estimate Hendren and Sprung-Keyser (2020) calculate willingness to pay for Pell Grant aid based on the increase in post-tax earnings amongst those who receive the aid. Denning et al. (2019) measure the impact of $1,000 in aid provided. They observe earnings gains over the course of 7 years and find that post-tax earnings, discounted by 3% back to the time of initial expenditure, rise by $5859. Hendren and Sprung-Keyser (2020) project the percentage earnings gains observed in year 7 and find a lifetime earnings impact of $104,691. They estimate the fiscal externality associated with the first seven years of earnings by taking the tax rate calculated in Denning et al. (2019) and supplementing with an estimate of the effect on government transfers. Hendren and Sprung-Keyser (2020) then use the Congressional Budget Office approach to estimate the long-term tax rate. The estimated earnings gains provide the willingness to pay for all individuals induced to change their behavior and receive more education as a result of the grants. Hendren and Sprung-Keyser (2020) calculate total willingness to pay by summing those earnings gains with the simple value of the transfer for the fraction of individuals not induced to change their behavior. This results in a willingness to pay of $85,737.
Combining these estimates, Hendren and Sprung-Keyser (2020) obtain an MVPF of \infty with a confidence interval of [\infty, \infty].
Hendren and Sprung-Keyser (2020) also consider a specification where the Pell Grant is valued at the cost of the transfer rather than based on the change in long-term earnings. This conservative method for calculating willingness to pay ignores any effect from increases in earnings. Instead, it applies the envelope theorem to those induced to get more schooling and assumes they are indifferent to the expenditure. All those who do not change their behavior as a result of the scholarship value it as a dollar-for-dollar transfer. The resulting MVPF for this alternate specification is \infty with a 95% confidence interval of [-\infty, \infty] .
Denning, Jeffrey T., Benjamin M. Marx and Lesley J. Turner (2019). “Propelled: The Effects of Grants on Graduation, Earnings, and Welfare.” American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, 11(3), 193-224. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1257/app.20180100
Hendren, Nathaniel and Ben Sprung-Keyser (2020). “A Unified Welfare Analysis of Government Policies.” The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 135(3): 1209–1318. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1093/qje/qjaa006
Zimmerman, Seth D. (2014). “The Returns to College Admission for Academically Marginal Students.” Journal of Labor Economics, 32(4), 711-754. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1086/676661