Artmann, Fuchs-Schündeln, and Giupponi (2024) compute the MVPF of a reform that increased the generosity of Germany’s statutory public pension system. Germany’s pension system operates on a Pay-As-You-Go schedule, where individuals are obligated to pay into the system while working. Participants accumulate “pension points” with each payment, with one pension point defined as the contributions made by someone earning the national average income that year. Through the Mütterrente childcare pension benefit scheme, parents (usually mothers) continue to receive pension points while spending time raising their children.
In 2014, Germany retroactively gave mothers with children born before January 1, 1992 an additional pension point per child. These mothers saw on average a €3,830 (4.4%) increase in pension wealth, while mothers with children born after that date saw no change. Using working histories data for the entire population of workers subject to social security contributions and administrative data from the German Pension Insurance, the paper implements a difference-in-differences design that compares women who had their first child just before versus after January 1, 1992. The paper finds that mothers who saw an increase in their pension wealth from the reform reduced their labor earnings by 1.3% in the 3-5 years after the reform, or (in present value) by €2,660 in total. This response is driven entirely by reductions in labor supply from mothers who were already working (as opposed to mothers leaving the labor force).
MVPF = 0.8
The net costs to the government include both mechanical transfer costs and behavioral responses. The pension reform cost the government €3,830 per beneficiary, equal to the present value of the additional pension wealth. The reduction in beneficiaries’ labor supply generates a fiscal externality from reduced income tax revenue and social security contributions. Combining the estimated €2,660 reduction in lifetime earnings (in present value) with a marginal tax rate of 46.3%, the pension reform generated an additional €1,232 in costs per beneficiary. The total cost per beneficiary is therefore €3,830 + €1,232 = €5,062.
Spouses of beneficiaries on average saw earnings decrease by €997 (in present value). With a 47.5% average marginal income tax and social security contribution rate when filing jointly, and 78.5% of mothers filing jointly, accounting for changes in spousal earnings increases the total cost to €3,830 + €1,232 + €372 = €5,434.
Because the policy reform provided a pure wealth effect with no substitution incentives, beneficiaries value the pension transfer at its full monetary value. The reform increased pension wealth was €3,830.
The MVPF is then €3,830 / €5,062 = 0.76.
The paper reports a second MVPF which includes the fiscal externality from changes in tax remittances as a result of changes in spousal earnings. Accounting for this fiscal externality yields an MVPF of €3,830 / €5,434= 0.70.
Artmann, Elisabeth, Nicola Fuchs-Schündeln, and Giulia Giupponi (2024). “Forward-Looking Labor Supply Responses to Changes in Pension Wealth: Evidence from Germany.” Working Paper (CEPR Discussion Paper No. 18149). Most recent version: https://www.dropbox.com/scl/fi/77uv7bdazvfbop1sxlwkp/Muetterrente_241228.pdf