Introduced in 1997, the Hope tax credit was designed to help American families pay for college. The policy provides a 100% tax credit on the first $1,200 a household spends toward tuition and fees. It provides a 50% credit on the next $1,200 in expenditures. In 2007, the credit phased out between $47,000 and $57,000 for single filers and between $94,000 and $114,000 for joint filers.
Bulman and Hoxby (2015) provides causal estimates for the impact of Hope credit on college attendance. They use kinks in the phase in and phase out schedule to estimate those attendance effects. This MVPF estimate considers the MVPF implied by the kink in the tax schedule faced by single filers near the start of the phase out region. These filers are individuals who earn near $47,000.
Hendren and Sprung-Keyser (2020) take the causal estimates from Bulman and Hoxby (2015) and project the impact of the Hope credit on lifetime earnings and tax revenue. They utilize estimates from Zimmerman (2014) on the impact attendance of college on earnings and assume that the returns to college are constant in percentage terms over the lifecycle.
Provides No Benefit on Average
Bulman and Hoxby (2015) estimate that a dollar decrease in income leads to $0.064 fewer tax credits claimed by the household. That $0.064 is the direct cost of the program. The second stage regression from Bulman and Hoxby (2015) finds that, at the kink point, a dollar decrease in income decreases college attendance by 5.01 \cdot 10^{-6} percentage points. That decrease in attendance results in lower educational costs for the government. Hendren and Sprung-Keyser (2020) project out the impact those attendance changes onto changes in income. Then, they use a tax and transfer rate of 19.6% to determine the impact on the government’s budget. They find that government revenue falls by $0.120. Putting these components together, the total net cost of the policy is $0.16.
Hendren and Sprung-Keyser (2020) estimate that the willingness-to-pay for the policy is -$0.265. That figure is based on two components: 1) the change in post-tax earnings for those no longer induced to attend college due to the Hope credit, and 2) the quantity of individual tuition payments made by those no longer induced to attend more college. The total willingness to pay is post-tax earnings net of tuition payments.
The MVPF of this policy is -1.64. The 95% confidence interval is [-6.45,\infty]. For context, if the Hope credit had no effect on college attendance, we would expect the MVPF of this policy to be around 1 (the HOPE credit would simply be a tax cut that induced a muted behavioral response). As these calculations show, the observed causal effect of the HOPE credit policy is a sufficiently large MVPF estimate that deviates meaningfully from 1. That said, the confidence interval around the estimate is quite large and so we cannot rule out an infinite MVPF or an MVPF of 0. In other words, this means that one cannot statistically rule out that the HOPE credit either pays for itself or provides no benefit to the beneficiaries, and suggests the value of further work to increase the statistical precision of the impact of the HOPE credit.
Bulman, George B. and Caroline M. Hoxby (2015). “The Returns to the Federal Tax Credits for Higher Education.” Tax Policy and the Economy, 29(1), 13-88. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1086/683364
Hendren, Nathaniel and Ben Sprung-Keyser (2020). “A Unified Welfare Analysis of Government Policies.” The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 135(3): 1209–1318. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1093/qje/qjaa006
Zimmerman, Seth D. (2014). “The Returns to College Admission for Academically Marginal Students.” Journal of Labor Economics, 32(4), 711-754. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1086/676661