The Tax Relief Act of 1997 introduced two forms of federal tax credits for higher education: the Hope Learning Credit (HTC) and the Lifetime Learning Tax Credit (LLTC). The Hope credit provided assistance to the first two years of college and was a 100% credit for the first $1,000 of qualified educational expenses. It was a 50% credit for the next $1,000. The LLTC was available for one’s lifetime and was not restricted to the first two years of postsecondary education. The benefit applied to 20% of the first $5,000 in qualified educational expenses, resulting in a maximum of $1,000 credit per tax return. Students could not take both the Hope and Lifetime Learners credits.
Long (2004) uses data from the 1990-2000 October Current Population Survey to estimate the impact of credit take-up from these two programs on college enrollment using a difference-in-difference around the enacting of the 1997 Tax Relief Act. Hendren and Sprung-Keyser (2020) take these causal estimates and project the impacts into lifetime earnings and tax revenue. They utilize estimates from Zimmerman (2014) on the impact attendance of college on earnings and assume that the returns to college are constant in percentage terms over the lifecycle.
Provides No Benefit on Average
Hendren and Sprung-Keyser (2020) calculate net costs beginning with the direct cost of the tax credit. They calculate this to be $48.87. This includes the mechanical cost of the credit for those attending college scaled by the credit claim rate estimated by Long (2004). It also includes the tax credit costs for those induced into attending college. Next, Hendren and Sprung-Keyser (2020) estimate the cost of changing educational attainment due to the tax credits. This calculation follows the approach of Zimmerman (2014), calculating government costs as total educational costs net of tuition paid by enrollees. Given the program’s estimated (statistically insignificant) negative effect on enrollment, this yields an enrollment cost of -$404.71. Finally, Hendren and Sprung-Keyser (2020) account for the changes in taxes paid and transfers received due to changes in earnings. (The WTP section below outlines these calculations.) They estimate that declining earnings reduce government revenue by $593.36. Adding that value to the other costs components, they arrive at a total net cost of $237.52, with a wide confidence interval that includes zero.
To calculate the willingness to pay, Hendren and Sprung-Keyser (2020) transform the effect of tax credits on college attendance into additional years of schooling. They assume that individuals induced to depart school complete two fewer years of college education on average. They, then use estimates from Zimmerman (2014) to estimate the impact of that schooling on lifetime earnings. They calculate post-tax and post-transfer earnings by assuming a tax and transfer rate of 20.0% during the bulk the lifecycle. Then, they calculate changes in private tuition costs using data from the Delta Cost Project for 2011. Because the college impacts are negative, these credits have a negative willingness to pay of -$2092.60, with a wide confidence interval that includes zero.
Combining these net cost and willingness to pay estimates produces a negative MVPF. This suggests the government expenditures on the policy does not deliver any benefit. However, the 95% confidence interval is extremely wide and includes positive and negative infinity. This suggests value to future work that generates more statistically precise estimates.
For context, if the Hope credit had no effect on college attendance, we would expect the MVPF of this policy to be around 1 (the HOPE credit would simply be a tax cut that induced a muted behavioral response). As these calculations show, the observed causal effect of the HOPE credit policy is a sufficiently large MVPF estimate that deviates meaningfully from 1. That said, the confidence interval around the estimate is quite large and so we cannot rule out an infinite MVPF or an MVPF of 0. In other words, this means that one cannot statistically rule out that these tax credits either pay for themselves or provide no benefit to the beneficiaries.
Long, Bridget (2004). “College Choices: The Economics of Where to Go, When to Go, and How to Pay for It.” The University of Chicago Press Books, Chapter 4, 101-168. https://www.nber.org/books-and-chapters/college-choices-economics-where-go-when-go-and-how-pay-it/impact-federal-tax-credits-higher-education-expenses
Hendren, Nathaniel and Ben Sprung-Keyser (2020). “A Unified Welfare Analysis of Government Policies.” The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 135(3): 1209–1318. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1093/qje/qjaa006
Zimmerman, Seth D. (2014). “The Returns to College Admission for Academically Marginal Students.” Journal of Labor Economics, 32(4), 711-754. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1086/676661