A feed-in tariff (FIT) is the price that wind installers are paid for the electricity they generate. Since the installation market is competitive, the FIT closely tracks the levelized cost of electricity (LCOE) in each country, although it may also price in other benefits such as price stability. Nicolini and Tavoni (2017) use variation in renewable energy incentives across five EU countries, France, Germany, Italy, Spain and the United Kingdom, over 2000–2010 to estimate the impact of the FIT on renewable energy capacity. They estimate the effect of a one-euro-cent increase in the lagged FIT on total installed renewable capacity with four models (pooled OLS, fixed effects, random effects and Hausman-Taylor), and their capacity measure pools five renewable sources: biomass, geothermal, hydroelectric, solar and wind. Hahn, Hendren, Metcalfe, and Sprung-Keyser (2026) assume that US wind installers respond to changes in the cost of generation in the same way that European installers respond to changes in the FIT. They use the implied elasticity to estimate the MVPF of a one-cent-per-kWh expansion of the federal wind production tax credit (PTC) in the US in 2020, when the credit stood at 1.5 cents per kWh.
MVPF = 1.5
Hahn, Hendren, Metcalfe, and Sprung-Keyser (2026) take a precision-weighted average of the four estimates, which gives a semi-elasticity of total renewable capacity with respect to the FIT of 3.5%. The mean tariff over the five countries and the years of the sample, from OECD (2022), was $0.058 per kWh, or 0.048 euros, so a one-euro-cent change in the FIT is a 20.69% change. Dividing the 3.5% change in quantity by the 20.69% change in the FIT gives an elasticity of 0.17. This is the elasticity for all renewable generation; Hahn et al. (2026) apply it as if it were the wind elasticity in the US.
Hahn et al. (2026) then construct the 2020 MVPF with the same approach and externality values as for their US PTC estimates: a policy that expands the PTC by one cent per kWh, evaluated for a wind turbine that produces one MWh a year over a 25-year lifetime, with a mechanical transfer of $82.62 over the 10 years of credit. Turbines induced by the expansion also receive the existing 1.5-cent PTC, which creates a fiscal externality, and the cost also includes the climate fiscal externality, the US government’s share of the avoided climate damages through higher future GDP and tax revenue, which Hahn et al. (2026) set at 1.92% of the global environmental benefit, including learning-by-doing effects.
Per $1 of program spending, the fiscal externality from the existing credit is $0.051 and the climate fiscal externality lowers the cost by $0.009, so the net cost is $1.042.
As in their US PTC estimates, Hahn, Hendren, Metcalfe, and Sprung-Keyser (2026) build the willingness to pay (WTP) from four components: the mechanical transfer to inframarginal producers, valued in full; environmental benefits from the emissions displaced by the induced turbines; a rebound effect, as the added supply lowers the price of electricity and raises consumption; and learning-by-doing effects through future emissions and future prices. They do not include a change in producer profits, since wind producers are assumed to optimize at the margin across generation sources.
Per $1 of program spending, the WTP is the $1 transfer, $0.546 of global environmental benefits net of lifecycle emissions, $0.075 of local environmental benefits, a rebound that offsets $0.125, and learning-by-doing benefits of $0.016 (future emissions) and $0.050 (future prices), for a total of $1.561.
Combining these components, the MVPF is $1.561 / $1.042 = 1.498. With a social cost of carbon of $76 per ton in 2020 instead of $193, the MVPF falls to 1.237; with $337, it rises to 1.808. Hahn, Hendren, Metcalfe, and Sprung-Keyser (2026) do not estimate in-context MVPFs for studies outside the US. Because the paper pools all five renewable sources, they also leave this estimate out of their main analysis of wind. Because the elasticity comes from outside the US and Hahn et al. (2026) must add the assumption that it carries over to US wind installers, this estimate is part of their extended sample, and it is not included in their category average MVPF for wind production tax credits (5.870).
Hahn, Robert W., Nathaniel Hendren, Robert D. Metcalfe, and Ben Sprung-Keyser (2026). “A Welfare Analysis of Policies Impacting Climate Change.” American Economic Review, 116(7): 2368–2421. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.20250166
Nicolini, Marcella, and Massimo Tavoni (2017). “Are Renewable Energy Subsidies Effective? Evidence from Europe.” Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews, 74: 412–423. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.rser.2016.12.032
OECD (2022). “Environmental Policy: Renewable Energy Feed-in Tariffs (Edition 2021).” OECD Environment Statistics (database). DOI: https://doi.org/10.1787/4b3ab1e9-en