The Pell Grant provides financial support to students from low-income families attending college. Marx and Turner (2018) examine the impact of Pell Grants using a regression discontinuity design that examines students just above and just below the Pell Eligibility threshold based on individual’s family incomes. They calculate the impact of $1,000 in Pell Grant support on total credits earned, initial college enrollment and re-enrollment. Hendren and Sprung-Keyser (2020) use these estimates to project the impact of the policy on lifetime earnings and tax revenue. They utilize estimates from Zimmerman (2014) on the impact attendance of college on earnings and assume that the returns to college are constant in percentage terms over the lifecycle.
MVPF = 1.4
The treatment in this case is eligibility for the Pell Grant, and the initial program costs are normalized to $1,000 for the sake of the analysis. Next, Hendren and Sprung-Keyser (2020) account for the additional costs due to increased educational attainment on the part of those eligible for Pell aid. Hendren and Sprung-Keyser (2020) use estimates from Marx and Turner (2018) on the additional years of educational attainment. They calculate government costs per full time enrollee based on data from the Delta Cost Project. This increases costs by $133. Next, Hendren and Sprung-Keyser (2020) account for the changes in taxes paid and transfers received based on the earnings gains calculated in the willingness to pay section. That results in a fiscal externality of $117 and a total net cost of $1,016.
In their primary estimates, Hendren and Sprung-Keyser (2020) calculate willingness to pay for Pell Aid using estimates from Marx and Turner (2018) on the total number of additional credits received as a result of the grant. From there, Hendren and Sprung-Keyser (2020) translate those changes in credits in additional years of schooling and then use estimates from Zimmerman (2014) to estimate the impact on earnings. In particular, Hendren and Sprung-Keyser (2020) use the results from Zimmerman to estimate a decline in earnings in years 1-7 after enrollment and then an increase in earnings over the rest of the lifecycle. Hendren and Sprung-Keyser (2020) calculate the fiscal externality at 20% over the bulk of the lifecycle. This figure comes from their calculation of the effective marginal tax rates based on estimates from the Congressional Budget Office. This results in a post-tax and post-transfer increase in earnings of $443. Hendren and Sprung-Keyser (2020)] also subtract out individual contributions to tuition, as approximated by the Expected Family Contribution at the regression discontinuity cutoff. After scaling by years of enrollment, that reduces willingness to pay by $21. The projected earnings gains provide the willingness to pay for all individuals induced to change their behavior and receive more education as a result of the grants. Hendren and Sprung-Keyser (2020) calculate total willingness to pay by summing those earnings gains with the simple value of the transfer for the fraction of individuals not induced to change their behavior. This implies a willingness to pay of $1,417.
Combining the WTP and net cost estimates yields an MVPF of 1.39, with a 95% confidence interval of [-2.95, 12.88].
Hendren and Sprung-Keyser (2020)] also consider alternate approaches to calculating the earnings effect and determining willingness to pay. In the case of the earnings effect, they create a specification where their earnings projections are not based on credits completed but rather on initial enrollment and student re-enrollment. Hendren and Sprung-Keyser (2020) assume that these represent distinct groups of recipients and translate each outcome into an increase in years of schooling. They assume that initial enrollment results in two additional years of schooling, while re-enrollment results in one additional year. Hendren and Sprung-Keyser (2020) then apply the same earnings projection method from Zimmerman (2014) using these schooling increases. The resulting MVPF for this alternate specification is 2.60 with a 95% confidence interval of [-1.30,49.87]. Hendren and Sprung-Keyser (2020) also consider a specification where the Pell Grant is valued at the cost of the transfer rather than based on the change in long-term earnings. This conservative method for calculating willingness to pay ignores any effect from increases in earnings. Instead, it applies the envelope theorem to those induced to get more schooling and assumes they are indifferent to the expenditure. All those who do not change their behavior as a result of the scholarship value it as a dollar-for-dollar transfer. The resulting MVPF for this alternate specification is 0.98 with a 95% confidence interval of [0.54,1.52].
Hendren, Nathaniel and Ben Sprung-Keyser (2020). “A Unified Welfare Analysis of Government Policies.” The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 135(3): 1209–1318. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1093/qje/qjaa006
Marx, Benjamin M. and Lesley J. Turner (2018). “Borrowing Trouble? Human Capital Investment with Opt-in Costs and Implications for the Effectiveness of Grant Aid.” American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, 10(2), 163-201. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1257/app.20160127
Zimmerman, Seth D. (2014). “The Returns to College Admission for Academically Marginal Students.” Journal of Labor Economics, 32(4), 711-754. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1086/676661