The Cal Grant provides full tuition support to California college students who meet certain eligibility requirements such receiving a sufficiently high GPA in high school and having family income that falls below a given threshold. Bettinger et al. (2019) examine the impact of Cal Grant eligibility using eligibility discontinuities based on both high school GPA and family income. Hendren and Sprung-Keyser (2020) use these estimates to compute their implied MVPFs by projecting the impact of the policy on lifetime earnings and tax revenue. They utilize estimates from Zimmerman (2014) on the impact attendance of college on earnings and assume that the returns to college are constant in percentage terms over the lifecycle. The following outlines the MVPF construction for the estimates of the Cal Grant based on individuals who receive the Cal Grant because they fall just above the GPA threshold for scholarship eligibility.
Pays for Itself
Hendren and Sprung-Keyser (2020) calculate net costs by starting with $4,311 in initial program costs. During the late 1990s, when the students analyzed by Bettinger et al. (2019) were enrolled, the grant was worth between $1,500 and $3,500 for students enrolled in four-year public colleges and between $9,000 and $9,700 for students enrolled at private colleges.
Next, Hendren and Sprung-Keyser (2020) account for the additional costs due to increased educational attainment on the part of those eligible for Cal Grant. Hendren and Sprung-Keyser (2020) use estimates from Bettinger et al. (2019) on the number of additional bachelor’s degrees received by Cal Grant recipients and translate that into a fixed number of years of additional schooling, which they assume to be two in their baseline approach. They also use estimates from Bettinger et al. 2019 on the number of individuals who switch between four-year public institutions and two-year public institutions. In each case, Hendren and Sprung-Keyser (2020) follow the approach of Zimmerman (2014), and calculate government costs per full time enrollee based on data from the Delta Cost Project. This results in additional government costs of $1,002. Hendren and Sprung-Keyser (2020) also account for the increase in costs as those who would have enrolled in the absence of the Cal Grant are induced to attend more expensive schools. This adds $210 to total costs. Next, Hendren and Sprung-Keyser (2020) account for the changes in taxes paid and transfers received based on the earnings gains calculated in the willingness to pay section. That results in a fiscal externality of -$7,878 and a total net cost of -$2,355. The 95% confidence interval ranges from -$6,048 to $1,387.
In their primary estimate Hendren and Sprung-Keyser (2020) calculate willingness to pay for Cal Grant aid based on the increase in post-tax earnings amongst those who receive the aid. Bettinger et al. (2019) observe earnings gains over the course of 10-14 years and find that post-tax earnings, discounted by 3% back to the time of initial expenditure, rise by $7,387.
Next, Hendren and Sprung-Keyser (2020) project the percentage earnings gains observed in years 10-14 and find a lifetime earnings impact of $42,353. They calculate post-tax and post-transfer earnings by assuming a tax and transfer rate of 18.6%. This figure comes from their calculation of the effective marginal tax rates based on estimates from the Congressional Budget Office. The observed earnings gains provide the willingness to pay for all individuals induced to change their behavior and receive more education as a result of the grants. Hendren and Sprung-Keyser (2020) calculate total willingness to pay by summing those earnings gains with the value of the transfer for the fraction of individuals not induced to change their behavior. This yields a willingness to pay of $38,575, with a 95% confidence interval ranging from $15,278 to $63,448.
Combining these estimates, Hendren and Sprung-Keyser (2020) get an MVPF of \infty, with a 95% confidence interval of [10.72,\infty]
Hendren and Sprung-Keyser (2020) also consider a specification where the Cal Grant is valued at the cost of the transfer rather than based on the change in long-term earnings. This conservative willingness to pay method ignores any effect from increases in earnings. Instead, it applies the envelope theorem to those induced to get more schooling and assumes they are indifferent to the expenditure. All those who do not change their behavior as a result of the scholarship value it as a dollar-for-dollar transfer. The resulting MVPF for this alternate specification is \infty with a 95% confidence interval of [3.15,\infty].
Bettinger, Eric, Oded Gurantz, Laura Kawano, Bruce Sacerdote and Michael Stevens (2019). “The Long-Run Impacts of Financial Aid: Evidence from California’s Cal Grant.” American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, 11(1), 64-94. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1257/pol.20170466
Hendren, Nathaniel and Ben Sprung-Keyser (2020). “A Unified Welfare Analysis of Government Policies.” The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 135(3): 1209–1318. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1093/qje/qjaa006
Zimmerman, Seth D. (2014). “The Returns to College Admission for Academically Marginal Students.” Journal of Labor Economics, 32(4), 711-754. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1086/676661